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Abstract:  
The paper contains an analysis of the market structure when the inferior process chain 
company supplies the superior company with input resources and at the same time is 
vertically integrated with one of the superior companies. The possible anticompetitive effects 
of such vertically integrated structures are analyzed as well as the influence of information 
flows between inferior and superior enterprises of the sector on drivers of innovation and 
national welfare.  
 
These issues are relevant, if important information, in particular, information technology, 
design and specific characteristics of the product is available to inferior and superior sector 
enterprises. This situation is typical for high-tech sectors in which the inferior and superior 
product information exchange needs ensuring compatibility of products and preventing the 
additional costs of adjustment and increased functionality. The problem of assessing the 
appropriateness of imposing a ban on various divisions of a vertically integrated company to 
exchange non-public information received by one of its divisions from external sources is 
important. In the case of such a restriction, the inferior organizational division of a 
vertically integrated company may use personal information of the superior competitor only 
within the powers of its supplier, and cannot make it public for its superior organizational 
division as an example. The aim of the research is to develop an economic and mathematical 
model of business struggle with a vertically integrated company in the market. The paper 
contains the hypotheses and supporting evidence. 
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1. Indroduction 
 
The basic hypothesis is that information flows between the inferior and superior 
companies in the sector do not necessarily lead to a reduction of incentives for 
innovation and national welfare. It shows that the information flows lead to lower 
incentives for innovation in the superior self-dependent company. However, they 
lead to increased incentives for the innovation development of a vertically integrated 
company, at least if the investments in R&D companies are complementary. On the 
contrary, if the companies are involved in the innovative development competition, 
the incentives for innovations of a vertically integrated company are decreased with 
increasing intensity of external effects related to the information flow between the 
inferior and superior companies in the sector.  
 
However, with both forms of R&D, the "effective" R&D investments of a vertically 
integrated company are higher with external information flows than if various 
organizational divisions of a vertically integrated company are prohibited to 
exchange non-public information obtained by one of its organizational divisions 
from outside sources. If companies' investments in R&D are complementary, the 
national welfare is higher with external information flows than if various 
organizational divisions of a vertically integrated company are prohibited to 
exchange non-public information received by one of its organizational divisions 
from external sources, unless the level of externalities is very high, the types of 
products are not close substitutes, and the costs of innovative development are not 
too high. Also, if investments in R&D are an alternative, national welfare is higher 
with external information flows. Thus, this analysis indicates the inappropriate 
establishment of prohibition to exchange non-public information obtained by one of 
the various parts of vertically integrated company organizational divisions from 
third-party sources. 
 
The main purpose of the work is to develop an economic and mathematical model of 
competition with the presence of vertically integrated companies in the market; to 
study the impact of information flows externalities on the market equilibrium (the 
output volume, the wholesale resource price, the competing companies’ profit and 
their investments in R&D); to analyze the impact of externalities and information 
flows on the companies’ incentives to develop innovation and national welfare. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
The following methods are used: economic and mathematical modeling, the theory 
of optimization, the game theory (Blackwell and Girshick, 1979; Elettreby, 2016; 
Elsadany, 2017), the utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 2007), the 
random functions theory (Pugachev 1960; Pugachev 2013), analysis of differential 
equations (Ovsiannikov 2014; Frank, Mashevskaya, and Ermolina 2016), 
comparative static equilibrium (Hale and Lunel 2013), graphics, and constructive 
research. 
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The theoretical and methodological basis of the research are the works of scientists 
in the field of mathematical simulation of economic processes and systems, the 
enterprise theory, the game theory, methods of optimization, and methods of 
mathematical statistics. 
 
For the problems analysis, there is a model in which the company is a vertically 
integrated monopoly in the inferior resource market and at the same time, it 
competes in the market with the superior self-dependent company. The game is 
analyzed and includes three stages. At the first stage, integrated and non-integrated 
companies simultaneously and independently choose their R&D investment. At the 
second stage, a vertically integrated company offers input resources to a self-
dependent company at a wholesale price. Finally, at the third stage, companies 
produce differentiated products and compete in outputs in the final product market. 
 
The practical significance of the study results is that the represented economic and 
mathematical models and methods allow solving tactical and strategic objectives 
when developing effective strategies and forms of horizontal and vertical integration 
of enterprises with due regard to the market uncertainty. The game theory model of 
horizontal integration of stochastically conditions allows analyzing the companies’ 
incentives to division and the integrated companies’ influence on the national 
welfare in relation to the type of market uncertainty. The economic and 
mathematical model of competition with the presence of a vertically integrated 
company in the market may be used to evaluate the influence of vertically integrated 
structures to the competition in the superior market and to analyze the intensity of 
external informational flows on the companies’ incentives to develop innovation and 
national welfare. 
 
3. Results 
 
It is necessary to consider the sector that includes two companies, one of which is a 
vertically integrated company 
1UD , and the second is a self-dependent superior 
company 2D . The inferior organizational division of a vertically integrated 
company U  is a monopoly supplier of resources used in production. The superior 
organizational division of a vertically integrated company 
1D  receives the 
monopoly supplier inputs at marginal costs, and a self-dependent superior in 
technology chain company 2D  receives them at an endogenously determined 
wholesale price w . 
 
It is essential to consider a “game” that consists of three stages. At the first stage, 
both companies simultaneously and independently choose their R&D investment. At 
the second stage, a vertically integrated company 
1UD  offers input resources at a 
wholesale price to a self-dependent company 2D . Finally, at the third stage, 
companies produce differentiated products and compete in outputs.  
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Inverse demand functions for 
1UD  and 2D  companies are: 
211 dqqap  , 122 dqqap  ,                                                                    (1) 
where 0a , 10  d  is the degree of product differentiation, and 1q  and 2q  are 
volumes of 
1UD  and 2D  final production. These demand functions are derived with 
the use of the utility function of a typical consumer that depends on the final product 
output and has the following form: 
)2(
2
1
)( 21
2
2
2
121 qdqqqqqaU  . 
Functions that characterize the costs of 
1UD  and 2D  are: 
1211211 )(),,,( qkxxAqkxxC  , 
(2) 
22122 )(),,( qxwAqkxC  , 
 
where 01 x  and 02 x  are volumes of investments by 1UD  and 2D  in R&D,  
21 kxxA  , wxA  2 , 10  k .  
If the 
1UD  and 2D  companies’ investments in R&D are not present, the specific 
costs of both companies are A . The parameter k  determines the degree of external 
effects associated with innovative developments. The parameter k  reflects the 
extent to which the superior company uses the technological results obtained from 
competitor’s investments in R&D. 
 
Considering the influence of information flows between two organizational divisions 
of a vertically integrated company it is assumed that the non-integrated superior 
company does not receive any externalities ( 0k ), whereas an integrated company 
receives externalities ( 0k ), if there is an information flow relative to the research 
developments undertaken by the company 2D  between different 1UD  company’s 
organizational divisions. In other words, in equation (2) it is set 0k  if various 
organizational divisions of a vertically integrated company are prohibited to 
exchange non-public information obtained by one of its divisions from third-party 
sources, and 0k  with the availability of information flows. Even in the absence 
of investment in R&D the self-dependent company 2D  faces additional costs 
associated with buying resources at a wholesale price w  from the inferior 
monopolist U . 
 
The investments in R&D are subject to a law of diminishing returns that is 
considered in the quadratic function of the costs of R&D  
2
)(
2
i
i
x
xU  ,                                                                                                        (3) 
where 0 , 2,1i . 
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According to equation (3), the division cost of R&D increases with the size of the 
research laboratory. Thus, higher levels of investment in R&D require 
proportionately higher costs for the functioning of the research laboratory. In 
addition, a higher cost parameter   reflects the lower efficiency of investment in 
R&D. It is possible to assume that the second-order conditions are met, and 
companies choose strictly positive outputs in R&D. 
 
3.1 Equilibrium output volumes, profits of competing companies and their 
investments in R&D analysis 
 
The profit of 
1UD  and 2D  companies is determined by functions  
2
)()(
2
1
12112121
x
qkxxAqdqqawq   ,                                      (4) 
 
2
)()(
2
2
222122
x
qxwAqdqqa   .                                                  (5) 
 
The profit of an integrated company includes profits from the input resource and the 
final product sales. 
 
To maximize its profit each company decides on the output volume at the final 
“game” stage. The first profit maximization order conditions give the following 
response functions relative to the output volumes  
 
2
)(
)( 22121
dqkxxv
qR

 , 
(6) 
2
)(
)( 1212
dqwxv
qR

 , 
 
where Aav   is the market size. The terms in brackets represent an "effective" 
specific costs reduction for each company. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium final 
outputs (Nash 1950; Haurie and Marcotte 1985; De Wolf and Smeers 1997; Chen, 
Lu, Zeng, Dong, Hu, Guo and Chen 2017; Anikina, Gukova, Golodova and 
Chekalkina, 2016; Bashmakov, Popov, Zhedyaevskii, Chikichev and Voyakin 2015) 
are determined by the following equations: 
 
2
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4
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d
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 ,                                            (7) 
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

 .                                             (8) 
 
At the second “game” stage the vertically integrated company 
1UD  chooses the 
wholesale resource price in order to maximize its profit. By substituting (7) and (8) 
in (4) and calculating the first profit maximization order conditions relative to w , 
the following Equation (9) can be derived:  
 
)38(2
))2(4()48(
),,(
2
23
21
332
21
d
dkdxxdddv
kxxw


 ,                           (9) 
 
The analysis (9) shows that the wholesale price of the used resource is always 
positive; therefore, an independent company 2D  always faces an unprofitable cost 
ratio relative to a vertically integrated company 
1UD .  
By substituting (9) in (7) and (8), the expression of companies’ volumes outputs can 
be derived as a function of their investments in research and development, given in 
Eq. (10) and (11): 
)38(2
))2(2()8()28(
),,(
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d
dkdxdxddv
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

 ,                  (10) 
 
2
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212
38
)1()1(
2),,(
d
dkxdxdv
kxxq


 .                                                     (11) 
 
The firms choose their research and development investment volume from the profit 
maximization, at the first stage. By substituting the wholesale price and volumes of 
companies’ output as a function of their investments in research and development 
(9) - (11) in the profit function (4) and (5) and differentiating the company 
1UD  
profit function relative to 1x  and the company 2D  profit function relative to 2x , 
the companies’ reaction curves with regard to their research and development 
investment volume can be derived as following Eq. (12) and (13): 
 
22
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2
2
21
8)38(2
))8(4()48(
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dd
dkdxddv
kxR

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

,                                           (12) 
 
22
1
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8)38(2
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dxdvdk
kxR




                                                                (13) 
 
On the assumption that the denominators of both response functions are positive, 
from expression (13) it follows that the response curve ),( 12 kxR  is characterized 
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by a negative slope, i.e., R&D investments are strategic substitutes from the 
company 2D  perspective. Consequently, company 1UD  increasing R&D investment 
reduces the 2D  company's incentives to invest in R&D, and if various 
organizational divisions of a vertically integrated company are prohibited to 
exchange non-public information received by one of its organizational divisions 
from outside sources, 0k , and in the case of information flows presence, 0k . 
On the contrary, R&D investments can be either strategic substitutes or strategic 
complements from the point of view of the company 
1UD . It is reflected in the 
equation (12), where the response curve slope depends on the numerator factor 2x .  
 
R&D investments are strategic substitutes (strategic complements) only at low 
(high) degrees of external effects if the parameter k  is less (greater) than the critical 
value 
28
4
d
d
kcr

 . 
 
Figure 1 corresponds to a situation where R&D investments are strategic substitutes 
for both companies. In this case, when an independent company reduces its R&D 
investment, an integrated company increases its investment. However, if R&D 
investments are strategic complement only from the integrated company point of 
view (Figure 2), an integrated company does not respond to R&D reduction 
investment by investing less in its own innovative developments. The arrows show 
the response curves shift with the parameter k  growth (see the detailed analysis of 
the response functions is in the next section). Equations (12) and (13) show the 
equilibrium levels of R&D investments that are determined by equations  
LD
KB
vkx


 )(1 ,                                                                                                   (14) 
 
LD
Edk
vkx



)1(
8)(2 ,                                                                                           (15) 
with the following parameters 
08)]4(3)24(16[ 22  ddddB  , 
 
0)]1(1[8  kdkK , 
 
08)3)5(16)38(2[ 4222  dddD  , 
 
0]1)2(2[8  dkdkL  , 
 
01)1(2  dE  . 
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Figure 1. Company’ response curves to the volume of their R&D investments (R&D 
investments are strategic substitutes for both companies) 
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Figure 2. Companies’ response curves to the volume of their R&D investments 
(R&D investments are strategic complements for both companies) 
 
2R  
2R  
1x  
2x  
1R  1R  
crkk   
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Finally, by substituting expressions for the equilibrium levels of the research and 
development investments in Eq. (14) and (15) into (9), (10) and (11), the expressions 
for the wholesale price and production volumes equilibrium values can be derived: 
LD
dKF
vkw


 )( ,                                                                                           (16) 
 
LD
KG
vkq


 )(1 ,                                                                                              (17) 
 
LD
H
vkq


2
)(2  ,                                                                                              (18) 
with the following parameters 
 
0)328(4)]4(3)78(8[ 2432  ddddddF  , 
 
03)1(8)]2(3)24(16[ 222  ddddddG  , 
 
0)1)1(2)(38( 2  ddH  . 
 
Before proceeding to a comparison of situations characterized by the availability of 
information flows and whether there is a prohibition to exchange non-public 
information to the various organizational divisions of a vertically integrated 
company, it should be noted that a vertically integrated company makes higher 
investments in innovations and produces a higher volume of output than an 
unintegrated company, and if various divisions of a vertically integrated company 
are prohibited to exchange non-public information, received by one of its divisions 
from third-party sources, 0k , and in the case of information flow 0k . This 
result reflects the competitive advantage of a vertically integrated company with 
respect to an independent company that pays a higher price for the inputs used.  
Statement 1. For all values k , 10  k : 
1. R&D investments of a vertically integrated company outperform R&D 
investments of a non-integrated company, 
)()( 21 kxkx
  ; 
2. the output volume of a vertically integrated company exceeds the output of a non-
integrated company, 
)()( 21 kqkq
  . 
Evidence.  
1. Calculate the difference  
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LD
kdddd
vkxkx


 
 8)23(16)4(3
)()(
23
21 . 
 
If 0D , 0L , 10  k  and 10  d , we have 
0)1(2)1(1  ddkdd  , 
then there is inequality 
)()( 21 kxkx
  . 
2. If  
)()( 21 kxkx
   
and 0)(  kw . Then  
)()( 21 kqkq
  . 
 
4. Discussing the Results 
 
4.1 The influence of external information flows on the market equilibrium 
characteristics (output volumes, resources’ wholesale price, competing 
companies’ profits and their R&D investments) 
 
Situations characterized by the availability of information flows and the prohibition 
to various organizational divisions of a vertically integrated company to exchange 
non-public information received by one of its divisions from outside sources are 
compared in this section. The influence of information flows on innovation, the 
wholesale resource price, the output volume and the profit of companies are 
considered. It is reasonable to start with the analysis of R&D investments behavior 
of each company according to the external information flows intensity, since the 
requirement to prohibit different organizational divisions of a vertically integrated 
company to exchange non-public information received by one of its divisions from 
outside sources corresponds to the case of zero externalities. The results are 
summarized in the following Statement. 
Statement 2.  
 
1. R&D investments of a non-integrated company are reduced with increased 
intensity of external information flows k , 10  k ; 
2. R&D investments of a vertically integrated company grow with an increase in the 
intensity of external information flows k , if },1max{ kk  , where crkk  , and are 
always higher in the presence of information flows ( 0k ), than if various divisions 
of a vertically integrated company are prohibited to exchange non-public 
information obtained by one of its divisions from third-party sources. ( 0k ). 
Evidence.  
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1. If the equilibrium value )(2 kx

 is determined by the intersection point of the two 
curves of companies’ reaction relative to the volume of their R&D investments 
)),(()),(( 2
1
221 kkxRkkxR
   
and let kk  . The arrows in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show the response curves shift if the 
parameter k grows. From Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 it follows that 
)),(()),(( 2121 kkxRkkxR
   
and  
)),(()),(( 2
1
22
1
2 kkxRkkxR 

, 
then 
)),(())(( 2
1
221 kkxRkxR 

. 
Moreover, the curve )),(( 2
1
2 kkxR

 has a downward slope, while the curve 
)),(( 21 kkxR  has an upward slope if crkk   and a downward slope if crkk  , but 
for all values k  there is a chain of inequalities 
2
1
2
2
10
dx
dR
dx
dR 
 . 
 
Therefore, in order that 
)),(()),(( 2
1
221 kkxRkkxR 

, 
 
it is necessary that 
)()( 22 kxkx
  , 
i.e., investments )(2 kx

 should be a decreasing function k . 
2. The second part of Statement to be proved, it is known from (12) that 
)0,(),( 2121 xRkxR   
for all 2x  and 0k . If )0,( 21 xR  has a downward slope and )()0( 22 kxx  , 
the following expression can be derived: 
)0),0(()0),(( 2121 xRkxR  . 
It follows that 
)0),0(()),(( 2121 xRkkxR  , 
i.e., )0()( 11 xkx  . If kk  , from (12) the following expression can be derived: 
)),(()),(( 2121 kkxRkkxR   
for all 2x  and crkk  . In addition, the curve )),(( 21 kkxR  has a downward slope if 
crkk   and )()( 22 kxkx  . 
There is inequality  
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)),(()),(( 2121 kkxRkkxR  . 
It follows from 2 inequalities that 
)),(()),(()),(( 212121 kkxRkkxRkkxR  , 
 
i.e., )(1 kx  increases by k  if crkk  . To show the )(1 kx

 growth by k  if 
},1max{ kk  , differentiate )(1 kx

 relative to k . Assuming the derivative to be zero 
and solving the resulting equation with respect to k , the following expression can 
be derived: 
})64163(8]82)8[()38{(
8
1 2422   dddd
d
k . 
The check shows that crkk   for all d  and  , and that 1k  for some parameters 
values (for example, for sufficiently small d ). In this case )(1 kx

 grows by k  for all 
values k . 
 
Thus, external information flows have a negative impact on the independent 
company’s incentives to invest in R&D. Hence, the company 2D  undertakes lower 
investments in R&D if there are external information flows. On the contrary, the 
vertically integrated company undertakes higher investments in R&D if there are 
external information flows. Innovative developments externalities reduce the 
vertically integrated company’s costs; this leads to an output increase that in turn 
enhances the significance of any cost reduction leading to the company's own 
investment increase in R&D. Consequently, the company's 1UD  "effective" R&D 
investments 21 kxx   are also higher with external information flows than if various 
organizational divisions of a vertically integrated company are prohibited to 
exchange non-public information obtained by one of its divisions from outside 
sources. 
 
Statement 2 establishes that the intensity increases in external information flows k  
leads to a decrease of an independent company’s 2D  in R&D investments. Fig. 1 
and Fig. 2 show this result, where the arrows indicate the response curves’ shift 
direction with increasing intensity of the external information flows k . The intensity 
increases in the external information flows k  rotates the independent company’s 
2D  response curve counterclockwise around its intersection with the horizontal axes 
in Figure 1 and Figure 2. It is intuitively clear that the intensity increases in 
unilateral external information flows from the company 2D  to 1UD  further reduces 
the independent company’s 2D  R&D investments, since in this case a competing 
company uses its innovations. 
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On the other hand, the increase of externalities of information flows k  intensity 
rotates the integrated company’s 1UD  response curve clockwise around its 
intersection point with the axis 1x . In particular, if the parameter k  is such that the 
R&D investments are strategic substitutes for the vertically integrated company 
1UD , the increase in intensity of externalities k  leads to a steeper response curve 
1R  with a negative slope. If R&D investments are strategic substitutes, at an 
intuitive level the increase in intensity of externalities k  enhances the impact of 
externalities on the output volume that leads to a further increase in R&D 
investments of 1UD . 
 
If R&D investments are a strategic complement to a vertically integrated company 
1UD , the Fig. 1 analysis shows that the effect of the intensity increase in external 
information flows k  on R&D investments of a vertically integrated company is 
positive for intensity values of externalities k , that are higher and close to crk , 
whereas for higher intensity values of externalities k  this effect may be negative. 
The latter case has a simple interpretation. If R&D investments are strategic 
complements for a vertically integrated company 1UD , the intensity increase in 
external information flows k  makes innovation investments a stronger strategic 
complement for a vertically integrated company 1UD . It is known that the company 
2D  will respond to the intensity increase in external information flows k  by 
reducing its R&D investments. If innovative development investments cost enough 
(i.e.,   is quite high), a vertically integrated company 1UD  also has incentives to 
reduce its R&D investments to save on the implementing costs. The last positive 
effect over-compensates the negative impact on profits due to a smaller decrease in 
division costs. 
 
It is necessary to investigate the influence of external information flows on the 
company's output volumes. Since R&D investments allow companies to reduce their 
specific production costs, an increase (decrease) in the company's effective R&D 
investments should lead to increase (decrease) in the company’s output volume. It 
should be noted, however, that effective reduction of the specific production costs of 
2D  and, consequently, of its output, also depends on the price change of the 
resource used, assigned by 1UD . Comparing the wholesale price of various divisions 
of a vertically integrated company that are prohibited to exchange non-public 
information received by one of its divisions from external sources with the 
wholesale price with the presence of external information flows, a conclusion can be 
drawn that in the first case the price not only exceeds the price in the second case, 
but the wholesale price decreases with the intensity increase in the external 
information flows k  (see Statement 3). At the intuitive level, this is due to the 
external information flows influence on the derivative demand for the resources 
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used. External information flows reduce 2D ’s incentives to implement innovations 
and, consequently, reduce its demand for the resources used, forcing 1UD  to assign a 
lower price for resources to avoid large losses of profit when selling them. 
 
Statement 3. The wholesale price of resources used decreases with the intense 
growth of external information flows k , if 10  k . 
Evidence.  
 
By differentiating the equation (16) relative to k , the following expression can be 
derived: 
 
.
)(
)852)(38()38()2(12)2(8
]1)1(2[8
)(
2
23222
LD
dkdddddkdk
dv
k
kw





 


 
 
The denominator of this expression is always positive. The first factor of the 
numerator is positive. 
]1)1(2[8  dv   
The second factor decreases with the parameter  ’s increase. Consequently, it takes 
the greatest value with the minimum possible value of the parameter   that is equal 
to 
)1(2
1
d
. 
When substituting  
)1(2
1
d
  
to the second denominator factor, the following expression can be derived: 
.
)1(2
)1)(2(24516)](8)1(16[2 44
d
dddkdkdddddk


 
 
This expression is always negative if 10  k  and 10  d , e.g. )(kw

 decreases 
by k . 
 
A decrease in the wholesale price of the used resource if it is not prohibited for 
different divisions of the vertically integrated company to exchange non-public 
information received by one of its divisions from outside sources in case other 
circumstances are similar reduces the advantage in expenses of superior division of 
the vertically integrated company 1UD  and improves a competitive position of the 
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independent superior company. Yet the influence of external information flows on 
investments in R&D is greater than the influence of external information flows on 
the wholesale price of the used resource and, consequently, external information 
flows promote the increase of the output of the vertically integrated company 1UD  
and the decrease of the output of the independent superior company. 
Statement 4.  
 
1. The output of the independent superior company decreases with the growth of the 
intensity of the external information flows k , if 10  k . 
2. The output of the vertically integrated company 1UD  increases with the growth of 
the intensity of the external information flows k  , if all  
}
~
,1max{ kk  , 
where crkk 
~
, and is always higher when there are external information flows 
( 0k ), rather than when it is prohibited for different divisions of the vertically 
integrated company to exchange non-public information, received by one of its 
divisions from external sources ( 0k ). 
Evidence.  
 
1. Differentiate the equation (18) relative to k  and follow the procedure analogical 
to the one used in the evidence of Statement 3.  
2. Check, that private derivative from )(1 kq

 relative to k  is positive if 0k . To 
show, that )(1 kq

 increases by k , when }
~
,1max{ kk  , we differentiate )(1 kq

 on 
k . Equating the derivative to zero and solving the equation relative to k  is 
obtained, and then  
 
})38[()33264(8{
8
1~ 242 Sddd
d
k   , 
where  
222222 )38()8()38(88  ddddS  . 
 
It is possible to check that crkk 
~
 at all values of d  and  . Moreover, it is 
possible to check, that 1
~
k  for some of the parameter values (i.e., if d  is small 
enough), and in this case )(1 kq

 increases by k  regardless of the values of k . 
Calculate if 10  k  
 
)38(2
)()8())()0((2))0()()(8(
)0()(
2
2
2
2211
2
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d
kxdkkxxdxkxd
qkq


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As from Statement 2, )0()( 11
  xkx  and )()0( 22 kxx
  , consequently, 
)0()( 11
  qkq . 
 
Before the analysis from the point of view of the national welfare, it is important to 
analyze whether the vertically integrated company really has incentives to let 
information flows spread. In other words, it is important to scrutinize whether a 
vertically integrated company has or not any incentives to introduce prohibition for 
its different divisions to exchange non-public information received by one of its 
divisions from external sources. For this purpose, it is important to compare the 
profit of the vertically integrated company which has prohibited for different 
departments of the vertically integrated company to exchange non-public 
information received by one of its departments from external sources, with the profit 
of a company which allows external information flows. 
Statement 5.  
 
1. The income of the independent superior company declines with the growth of the 
intensity of the external information flows k , if 10  k . 
2. The income of the vertically integrated company 1UD  increases with the growth 
of the intensity of the external information flows k , at all 
},1max{ kk  , 
where crkk 
~
, and always higher if there are external information flows ( 0k ), in 
contrast to the situation when it is prohibited for different departments of the 
vertically integrated company to exchange non-public information received by one 
of its departments from external sources ( 0k ). 
Evidence. 
  
1. We get equilibria profits 2D , )(2 k
 , substituting the equations (14), (15), (16), 
(17), (18) in (5). Differentiating )(2 k
  on k , we get the resulting Statement. 
2. Substituting the equations (14), (15), (16), (17), (18) in (4), we get equilibria 
profits of the vertically integrated company 1UD , )(kVI
 . The aim is to show, that 
)(kVI
  is a quasiconcave function k  if 10  k . For this purpose, we calculate the 
derivative from )(kVI
  relative to k . After that, we check that this derivative is 
positive if 0k , 0)0( N . Then we need to show, that the second derivative from 
N  relative to k  ( kkN ) is negative at all values of k . For that purpose, we check 
that this derivative is negative for a minimum value of  
2
1
1 , 
and hence we set its negativity for all the values of  . This means, that derivative 
kkN  is originally negative and that it continuously decreases on  . Consequently, 
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its maximum value is at the minimum value of  . This proves, that )(kVI
  is a 
quasiconcave function k , if 10  k . Then it is necessary to check whether )1(N  
is positive. If )1(N  is positive, which is possible at low values of d , then )(kVI
  
increases by k  if 10  k ; consequently,  
)0()(   VIVI k   
if 10  k . On the other hand, if )1(N  is negative, we know, that )(kVI
  increases 
at first, but then decreases on k . Then we set, that )0()1(
  VIVI  , which again 
means )0()(   VIVI k   if 10  k .  
 
If it is not prohibited for different divisions of the vertically integrated company to 
exchange non-public information received by one of its divisions from outside 
sources, two factors apply. On the one hand, external information flows allow the 
vertically integrated company to use innovations of a competitor free of charge. As a 
result, there are effective investments in R&D of the vertically integrated company, 
which allows it to expand a superior business and to increase its profit from the sales 
of final products. Nevertheless, external information flows decrease incentives for 
investments in R&D of the independent company 2D , therefore declining its 
demand for the resources used. This leads to the decrease of wholesale price of the 
resources and, consequently, to the decrease of the profit on inferior market of the 
vertically integrated company.  
 
As follows from Statement 5, the first positive effect surpasses the second negative 
effect. Pure effect, this way, is in the growth of the profit of the vertically integrated 
company owing to external information flows. This conclusion means, that in case 
of the absence of the intervention by a regulator, inferior company has incentives to 
transmit to superior division the information concerning its competitor on inferior 
market. As far as the independent company is concerned, the decline in its profit 
with the growth of the intensity of external information flows is a direct 
consequence of decrease in its investments in R&D and output (Statements 2 and 4). 
 
4.2 Analysis of the influence of external informational flows on the total 
national welfare 
 
To answer the question as to whether a regulator of the economic policy should 
introduce prohibition for different departments of the vertically integrated company 
to exchange non-public information received by one of its departments from external 
sources, it is necessary to analyze it from the national welfare perspective. Namely, 
it is important to compare collective national welfare when there are external 
information flows ( 0k ) and when it is prohibited for different departments of the 
vertically integrated company to exchange non-public information received by one 
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of its departments from external sources ( 0k ). It is possible to determine 
collective national welfare as the sum of welfares of consumers and producers  
).(
2
)()2(
2
1
))(()(
2
2
2
122
12121
2
2
2
121
xxqx
qkxxqdqqqqqAakW



 (19) 
 
It turns out that the pure influence of external information flows on collective 
national welfare depends on effectiveness of the innovational technology  , the 
extent of the differentiation of the product d  and the intensity of external 
information flows k . 
 
Statement 6. At low and moderate values of  , and at high values of   if the extent 
of the differentiation of product d  is low enough, collective national welfare is 
always higher if there are external information flows ( 0k ), rather than when it is 
prohibited for different departments of the vertically integrated company to 
exchange non-public information received by one of its departments from external 
sources ( 0k ). At high values of   if the extent of the differentiation of product 
d  is high enough, there is such a value of k  that at all kk   national welfare is 
higher when it is prohibited for different departments of the vertically integrated 
company to exchange non-public information received by one of its departments 
from external sources ( 0k ), rather than when there are external information flows 
( 0k ), and vice versa if kk  . Besides, k  decreases by  .  
Evidence.  
 
To prove that collective national welfare )(kW  is a quasi-concave function k  if 
10  k , we should follow the same procedure as the one we used to prove 
Statement 5. Thus, we conclude, that if   and d  are high enough, then 
)1()0( WW  , while the opposite is true at all the other values. Consequently, if 
)1()0( WW  , then collective national welfare is always higher when there are 
external information flows ( 0k ), rather than when it is prohibited for different 
departments of the vertically integrated company to exchange non-public 
information received by one of its departments from external sources ( 0k ). If 
)1()0( WW  , quasi-concaveness means that there is the only possible k , so that all 
kk   collective national welfare is higher when there are external information 
flows ( 0k ), rather than when it is prohibited for different departments of the 
vertically integrated company to exchange non-public information received by one 
of its departments from external sources ( 0k ). And, on the opposite, at all kk  , 
where k  is a solution to the equation )()0( kWW  . Finally, it is shown that k  
decreases on  . This can be illustrated by the following. First, it is necessary to 
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show that both the first derivative from )(kW  relative to  , W , at the minimum 
value of  , and the second derivative from )(kW  relative to  , W , are negative. 
For this purpose, we prove, that the second derivative from )(kW  relative to  , 
W , is negative at the minimum value of  , and the third derivative from )(kW  
relative to  , W , is negative. These two results mean, that collective national 
welfare )(kW  is a decreasing function with the increasing speed on  . 
Consequently, its maximum value is at the minimum value of  . 
 
In other words, at low or moderate costs on innovative development, collective 
national welfare is always higher when there are external information flows ( 0k ), 
rather than when it is prohibited for different departments of the vertically integrated 
company to exchange non-public information received by one of its departments 
from external sources ( 0k ). To interpret this income we notice, that according to 
Statement 1, 1UD  has a bigger part of the market, than 2D , both with and without 
external information flows. In other words, 1UD  and 2D  are asymmetric even 
without investments in R&D, and apparently, 1UD  is more effective since it has 
lower production costs. According to Statements 2 and 4, the presence of external 
information flows increases the benefit of 1UD  in costs, as it increases its share of 
the market. Thus, if there are external information flows, output is transferred to the 
most effective company, which can result into growth of collective national welfare. 
There will be the same level of national welfare in case of higher values of expenses 
on innovative developments provided that the production of the companies is 
differentiated enough.  
 
However, if the expenses on innovative development are high enough and the types 
of products the companies make are very close substitutes, the result, which was 
marked above, is changing to the opposite if the intensity external information flows 
k  is high enough, which means kk  . As it is illustrated on Fig. 3, the national 
welfare is higher if it is prohibited for different departments of the vertically 
integrated company to exchange non-public information received by one of its 
departments from external sources, rather than when there are external information 
flows, if, for example,  
10  and 84,0d  
at all 99,0k , while if continuous curve - 8 , dotted line - 9 , dot-dash line 
- 10 10  and 949,0d then at all 926,0k .  
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Figure 3. Comparison of the national welfare if it is prohibited for different 
departments of the vertically integrated company to exchange non-public 
information received by one of its departments from external sources, with the case 
when there are external information flows. 
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 Here is an interpretation of this result. If the expenses on innovative development 
are very high, even a vertically integrated company will make small investments in 
scientific and research developments and, consequently, the extra savings due to 
external information flows plays a minor role in comparison with the national 
welfare perspective. Apart from that, if intensity of external information flows k  is 
high, the problem of the assignment of the results of innovative development for the 
independent company 2D  is of such a high importance that 2D  makes few 
investments in R&D and 1UD  wins less from external information flows. It is 
essential to consider that the problem of the assignment of the results of innovative 
development for 2D  increases depending on how similar substitutes made by 
companies are, since the more intense the competition, the higher the negative 
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impact is concerning the inability to apply results of innovative development of 2D . 
The combination of all the mentioned effects can lead to the changes in the results of 
the analysis of welfare to the opposite. To make such changes, it is important, that 
the types of products, which companies make, are very close substitutes, expenses 
on innovative development are quite high and the intensity of external information 
flows k  is also high.  
 
4.3 Modeling and analysis of the influence of competition between companies in 
innovation development on market equilibria characteristics  
 
In this section it will be analyzed, how the results above are changing in case of the 
alternative situation, namely in assumption that companies are involved in 
competition after coming up with the same innovation. The competition in 
innovative developments is modeled as a stochastic process. Both companies make 
investments in R&D, which in case of success leads to one innovation h , and at the 
same time it will provide savings, when  
0 hA  and 
hAa
Aa
d


 . 
Investments in R&D of a company determine the probability  , with which a 
company will succeed in innovation. Costs on investments in R&D of a company 
can be determined in the following way.  
 
))1ln(()( iiiG   , 10  i , 0 , 2,1i , (20) 
so that 
0)0()0( GG , 0)(  iG  , 0)(  iG  , 
 


)(lim)(lim
11
ii GG
ii


. 
It is possible to suppose that in terms of the description of one-sided external 
information flows 1UD  reaches success in R&D, if it either develops innovation on 
its own or manages to imitate innovation designed by a third company 2D , i.e., with 
the probability  
211 )1(  k , 
where k  - intensity of external information flows, 10  k , and 2D  develops an 
innovation with the probability 2 .  
Depending on failure or success in developing an innovation, the profits of 
integrated and independent companies can be denoted as: 
B
1 , 
B
2 , if both 
companies develop innovations; 
N
1 , 
N
2 , if neither of the companies manages to 
develop an innovation; 
1
1 , 
1
2 , if only 1UD  succeeds in R&D; 
2
1 , 
2
2 , if only 2D  
succeeds in R&D. Consequently, the expected profit of 1UD  is as follows: 
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And it is possible to write an analogous equation for 2D . The staging of the “game” 
is as follows. At the final stage of the “game”, each company decides on the volume 
of output to maximize profits. At the second stage of the “game”, 1UD  decides on 
the wholesale price for the resources to maximize profits. At the first stage, 
companies decide on the volumes of their investments in R&D to maximize profits. 
Analysis shows that investments in R&D, expected output and profit of the 
independent company as well as the expected wholesale price are lower if there are 
external information flows, in comparison with the situation when it is prohibited for 
different departments of the vertically integrated company to exchange non-public 
information received by one of its departments from external sources. An opposite 
conclusion is also correct for the expected volume of production and profit of the 
vertically integrated company. However, competition in innovative developments 
changes motivation for innovations in a vertically integrated company, which in this 
case does not invest more if there are external information flows in comparison with 
the situation when it is prohibited for different departments of the vertically 
integrated company to exchange non-public information received by one of its 
departments from external sources. This result can be explained by the nature of 
investments in scientific and research developments under considered circumstances 
in comparison with the economic-mathematical model of competition if there is a 
vertically integrated manufacturing company. Here, investments in innovative 
developments of two companies lead to the same amount of savings in case of 
success. For example, if 1UD  succeeds in developing innovation for savings h , 
externalities from 2D , in case it also achieves the same success in developing 
innovation, do not lead to a higher amount of savings, and, consequently, they do 
not motivate further investments in innovative development. Apart from that, in 
terms of available externalities 1UD  can achieve the same savings while investing 
less in innovations, and therefore generate more profit rather than when it is 
prohibited for different departments of the vertically integrated company to 
exchange non-public information received by one of its departments from external 
sources. It is necessary to point out that expected effective investments of 1UD  in 
innovative developments, i.e., total expected savings  
211 )1(  kx   
are higher if there are external information flows, rather than when it is prohibited 
for different departments of the vertically integrated company to exchange non-
public information received by one of its departments from external sources.  
 
As for the national welfare, calculations show that if companies compete in 
developing innovations designed for savings, external information flows are more 
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preferable than the situation when it is prohibited for different departments of the 
vertically integrated company to exchange non-public information received by one 
of its departments from external sources. This can be explained not only by the 
above-mentioned asymmetry effect of market shares of two competing companies, 
but also by the fact that externalities help to avoid excessive investments in 
innovations. This decreases the amount of total costs, and thus it enhances national 
welfare. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Possible anti-competition effects of vertically integrated structures were analyzed in 
this paper. Apart from that, the influence of information flows on the motivation for 
innovation development and the national welfare is considered in terms of inferior 
and superior enterprises of the sector. For scrutinizing the abovementioned 
problems, a model was build where vertically integrated company is a monopoly on 
the inferior resource market and at the same time it participates at the superior 
market together with a third superior company. It was established that information 
flows between inferior and superior enterprises in the sector do not necessarily lead 
to disincentive to development of innovations and the national welfare. It was shown 
that information flows lead to disincentive to development of innovations with 
regard to the vertically integrated company, at least if investments in R&D are 
complementary. However, if enterprises are engaged in competition in innovative 
development, there are less disincentives to innovation development of the vertically 
integrated company following the increase in intensity of external effects connected 
with information flows between inferior and superior companies in the sector.  
 
However, regardless of the abovementioned forms of R&D, “effective” innovations 
of the vertically integrated company in scientific and research developments are 
higher if there are external information flows, but lower if it is prohibited for 
different departments of the vertically integrated company to exchange non-public 
information received by one of its departments from external sources. If companies’ 
investments in scientific and research developments are complementary, the national 
welfare is higher, provided that there are external information flows, than in case 
when it is prohibited for different departments of the vertically integrated company 
to exchange non-public information received by one of its departments from external 
sources, provided that the amount of information received from external sources is 
not too high, or the types of products are not close substitutes or expenses on 
development of innovations are not too high. Moreover, if company’s investments in 
R&D are an alternative, the national welfare is higher if there are external 
information flows.  
 
6. Acknowledgements 
 
The publication has been prepared within the Russian Foundation for Humanities 
(RFH). Project #17-12-59009 “Features of Development of a Regional Industrial 
A.A. Urasova, P.A. Kuznetsov, A.V. Plotnikov 
  
101  
Complex in the Conditions of the Current Economic Crisis”. 
 
References: 
 
Anikina, I.D., Gukova, А.V. Golodova, A.A. and Chekalkina, A.A. 2016. Methodological 
Aspects of Prioritization of Financial Tools for Stimulation of Innovative 
Activities. European Research Studies Journal, 19(2), 100-112. 
Bashmakov, A.I., Popov, V.V., Zhedyaevskii, N.D., Chikichev, N.D. and Voyakin, A.E. 
2015. Generic Heurorithm of Innovation Management from Generating Ideas to 
Commercialization. European Research Studies Journal, 18(4), 47 -56. 
Blackwell, D.A.,  Girshick, M.A. 1979. Theory of games and statistical decisions. Courier 
Corporation. 
Chen, G., Lu, E., Zeng, K., Dong, C., Hu, S., Guo, H., Chen, Q. 2017. Electricity Market 
Nash-Cournot Equilibrium Analysis with High Proportion of Gas-fired 
Generators. Energy Procedia, 105, 3282-3288. 
De Wolf, D.,  Smeers, Y. 1997. A stochastic version of a Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot 
equilibrium model. Management Science, 43(2), 190-197. 
Elettreby, M.F. 2016. Dynamical analysis of a Cournot duopoly model. Journal of the 
Egyptian Mathematical Society, 24(4), 681-686. 
Elsadany, A.A. 2017. Dynamics of a Cournot duopoly game with bounded rationality based 
on relative profit maximization. Applied Mathematics and Computation, 294, 
253-263. 
Frank, E.V., Mashevskaya, E.V. and Ermolina, L.V. 2016. Innovational Mechanism of 
Implementation of Cluster Initiatives in Business. European Research Studies, 
19(1), 179 -188. 
Hale, J.K., Lunel, S.M.V. 2013. Introduction to functional differential equations (Vol. 99). 
Springer Science & Business Media. 
Haurie, A., Marcotte, P. 1985. On the relationship between Nash—Cournot and Wardrop 
equilibria. Networks, 15(3), 295-308. 
Nash, J.F. 1950. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the national academy 
of sciences, 36(1), 48-49. 
Ovsiannikov, L.V.E. 2014. Group analysis of differential equations. Academic Press. 
Pugachev, V.S. 1960. Theory of random functions and its application to Control Problems. 
Moscow, State Publishing House of Physical and Mathematical Literature. Pp: 
883. 
Pugachev, V.S. 2013. Theory of Random Functions: And Its Application to Control 
Problems, (5). Elsevier. 
Von Neumann, J., Morgenstern, O. 2007. Theory of games and economic behavior. 
Princeton university press. 
  
 
